Santiago was one of the first cities outside the OECD to implement a tradable permit program to control air pollution. This paper looks closely at the program's performance over the past ten years, stressing its similarities and discrepancies with trading programs implemented in developed countries, and analyzing how it has reacted to regulatory adjustments and market shocks. Studying Santiago's experience allows us to discuss the drawbacks and advantages of applying tradable permits in less developed countries
INTRODUCTION
Policy makers have paid increasing attention to market based policy instruments over the last decades. Tradable emission permits have been at the center of this discussion due to the theoretical promise of cost-effectiveness and because they have been used successfully in the United States to reduce sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). However, it remains an open question whether tradable permits are appropriate for use in transition and developing economies due to lack of institutions and expertise with market based policies.
There are also many crucial design issues for the permit schemes as well as several competing instruments such as environmental taxes.
Those arguing in favor of market-based instruments emphasize that they are efficient instruments that relax the trade-off between economic growth and improved environmental quality, and that they can be achieved without specific knowledge of the technology or pollution-reduction costs of polluting sources. On the other hand, those opposed to the use of tradable permits programs in developing countries emphasize the lack of transparency and monitoring possibilities, the inadequate legal systems, and foremost the difficulties involved in creating a functioning market observed in less developed countries. [See Bell and Rusell (2002) and Bell (2004) ]. However pervasive constraints would affect the performance of any instrument including both economic policies and command and command and control policies [Ellerman (2002) ], although the implementation of more sophisticated policy instruments, as tradable emission permits, might require the decision maker to implement some particular institutional changes. For that reason, some market advocates argue that emissions taxes would be more appropriate, since they imply a change to an effective economic incentive system and raise revenue for environmental projects and programs. [See Eskeland et al. (1992) , Krupnick (1997) , Blackman and Harrington (2000) ].
Finally, advocates of trading approaches argue that as countries develop and as economies and political systems become more willing to impose real environmental requirements, trading programs will become more adequate. Then, the important point is to start developing the institutions to build over the coming years now [See Krueger (2003) ]. However, there has been rather limited experimentation with tradable permits in less developed countries, although efforts have been made in some transitional countries like Poland, Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic to implement emission trading programs during the 1990s [See Zylicz (1995) , Farrow (1999) , Hauff and Missfeldt (2000) and Bell (2004) ] and the academic and governmental interest in implementing emissions trading in China [See Ellerman (2002) ]. In all these cases the main concern have been related to the transition from pre-existing environmental regulations to tradable emissions permits and the monitoring and enforcement capabilities that would be required in order to ensure compliance.
Santiago was one of the first cities outside OECD to implement a tradable permit program.
The program launched in 1997 to control emissions coming from stationary sources of pollution has been characterized by a combination of failures affecting the attractiveness of trading: -over allocation of permits, high transaction costs, lack of clear penalties to 4 sources in violation and several regulatory changes affecting the tenure over emission permits and hampering trade. The total amount of emission permits initially granted to incumbent sources has been decreased twice; the rate of offsetting has been raised twice while the program's rules have lead many sources to lose their emission permits because trade is only allowed within a specified period of time and banking permits is not possible.
How has the emissions market reacted to these new regulations and conditions? Currently 46.3 percent of the initial mass of permits became void and 38 percent of this voided mass has been lost because incumbent sources did not trade before the legal deadline.
Why did sources not trade before the legal deadline? In this paper we analyze the design and implementation issues limiting the development of the tradable permit market in Santiago, as well as the challenges and advantages of applying tradable permits in less developed countries.
Previous studies evaluating the performance of the Santiago's trading program were done at early stages of its implementation. Montero et al. (2002) found that the grandfathering used to allocate emissions initially created economic incentives for incumbent sources to more readily declare their historic emissions in order to claim permits. O'Ryan et al. (2002) examined the impact of the introduction of natural gas in the applicability of the tradable permit program, concluding that this fuel increased the range of emissions potentially abated at a lower cost and reduced the efficiency gains from using a market based instrument. Finally, Palacios and Chavez (2005) evaluated the performance of the program in terms of enforcement, concluding that the aggregate level of over-compliance coexists with frequent violations of regulations by some of the sources. This paper goes more deeply into these issues using an updated database in order to analyze whether the program has improved through time and how it has reacted to regulatory adjustments and market shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main lessons from the international experience with tradable permit programs. The third section describes the tradable permit program applied in Santiago. Then, the design and implementation issues limiting the development of the market are analyzed. The last section reviews the lessons that can be learnt from Santiago' experience and concludes.
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II. THE USE OF TRADABLE PERMIT PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
Although the efficiency properties of tradable permit programs were discussed by some economists in the early 1970s [Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972] , it was not until the early 80s they started to be promoted in academia. The rise of interest occurred at the same time as many of the basic environmental laws were being written in the U.S. They were used to provide greater flexibility to firms charged with controlling air pollutant emissions (EPA's Emission Trading Programs), to phase out leaded gasoline and ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) from the market and to reduce sulphur dioxides (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) in the Los Angeles basin (RECLAIM). There was a gradual learning process concerning design issues that led up to the launching of the successful U.S. tradable permit program to control acid rain by cutting nationwide emissions of SO 2 .
Apart from the EU ETS program, the world's first large-scale CO 2 1 In 1991, the first pilot Project of emissions trading was carried out in Chorzow as an experiment following an agreement between the Minister of Environment and regional authorities. The project let several polluters in one of the most contaminated neighborhoods to jointly comply with individual emissions standards.
Despite profound legal problems and a turbulent political environment against the policy, it led to a radical decrease of pollution and significant savings. (See Zylicz, 1995) There are also a large number of programs in various countries with tradable fishing quotas that have quite a few similarities with the programs we discuss here.
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concerns the features that make trading programs more efficient.
Regarding the first lesson, the overall experience with emissions trading is that it can work. The right to trade must be clearly defined and not subject to case-by-case approval.
Ellerman (2005) distinguishes between the incentives to trade provided by the three types of emissions trading: credit -based, allowance -based and averaging -based trading. In credit -based trading, credits can be created by reducing one source's emissions more than required by some pre-specified standard and transferring the credit to another source, which is thereby allowed to increase emissions above the standard. Although sources can propose trades, the final decision to create the credits and make the transfers rests with the regulator.
On the other hand, in allowance-based trading rights to emit are created initially and distributed to sources, and there is no presumption that individual sources will limit emissions to the number of allowances they receive. They are free to trade allowances and the only requirement is that allowances equal emissions at the end of every compliance period. Averaging-based trading presumes a pre-specified standard of which emissions are traded, but subsequent trade between sources is not confined by regulatory approval.
In practice, credit-based trading has not worked very well because of the high transaction It is clear that high transaction cost lower the effectiveness of tradable permits significantly.
Transaction costs include the costs of finding an appropriate trading partner, establishing the terms of trade and completing the arrangements. The inclusion of the private sector fulfilling brokerage needs allows reducing these costs, increasing the economic incentives to trade. According to Tietenberg (1999) , most observers of the early EPA emissions trading programs agree that fewer trades took place than necessary to achieve full costeffectiveness and that high transactions costs played a role in explaining this shortcoming.
Anecdotal evidence can be found in the predominance of intra-firm (within firms) transactions over inter-firm (between firms) transactions. 
III. SANTIAGO'S TRADABLE PERMIT PROGRAM
In 1992, the Chilean environmental authority established a tradable permit program for total suspended particles (TSP) trying to control the adverse effects produced by the Since regulated sources were relatively small for the purpose of implementing sophisticated monitoring processes, the program was not designed on the basis of actual emissions but rather on a proxy variable equal to the maximum emissions that a source could emit in a given period of time. Thus, the daily cap on emissions of existing large boilers was calculated according to a formula that allowed them to emit a maximum given by the product of the maximum flow rate (m 3 /hr) of the gas exiting the stack times 24 hours of operation times a target on emissions concentration equal to 56*10 -6 (kg/m 3 ).
As the program progressed, PROCEFF came to realize that its initial allocation was too generous. SD 16 modified the quantity of allowed emissions to existing large boilers 2 was set at 100%, but in 1998 it was increased to 120% and in 2000 it was increased to 150%. Table 1 syntheses the main regulatory adjustments and program features. Table 2 summarizes some statistics about affected sources and shows the evolution of the stock of aggregate emission permits from 1997 to 2007. The summary was prepared using PROCEFF 3 databases and contains information about the number of sources in the program, the initial allocation of permits, the aggregate emissions, the offsetting of permits, the sources' flow rate, the emissions concentrations and the number of firms using cleaner fuels. Because of limited resources, the regulator concentrated all its regulatory activity on the completion of the inventory and the allocation of permits. The process lasted five years, and during that period, the regulator did not track trading activity, so there was no reconciliation of permits and emissions until the market began to take off at the end of 1998. About the first point, the environmental authority granted emission permits assuming a 24 hours level of activity. However, large boilers work on average 18 hours per day.
PERFORMANCE OF THE SANTIAGO'S TRADABLE PERMIT PROGRAM
Additionally, 128 sources that did not exist in 1997 received emission permits because they were operating at the time SD 4 was promulgated. These factors produced an immediate excess of permits in the hands of the initial holders.
The difference between permits in force and aggregate emissions has remained through time because the switching to cleaner fuels has led to a decrease in the aggregate emissions.
Regarding this process, sources started to switch to cleaner fuels 5 from 1995 onwards, in response to several environmental regulations. The most popular cleaner fuel was natural gas, which started to be imported from Argentina in 1997. After its arrival, it became the cheapest and cleanest fuel readily available. Thereby, a quick switching process started and currently about 50 percent of large boilers declare to use natural gas, although many of 5 Sources started to switch to light oil, liquidified gas, kerosene and natural gas. All of them produce a lower emission concentration that the most demanding threshold imposed by the tradable permit program, which is 32*10 (kg/m 3 ) in the case of liquefied and natural gas. Thereby, the switching allowed sources to over comply with the emissions' cap. 15 them correspond to dual sources, burning also light oil.
Unfortunately, from 2004 onwards, Chile has faced severe restrictions over the amount of natural gas that can be imported, giving rise to the so called "natural gas crisis". Since then, large boilers have faced more and more severe restrictions over the quantity of natural gas available and they have again started to burn light oil, which has led to an increase in the aggregate emissions. In fact, aggregate emissions in 2007 were almost 27 percent larger than aggregate emissions in 2004. The first counterfactual allows us to identify the effect of the overestimation of the maximum amount of emissions that sources emitted, while the second counterfactual allows identifying the effect of the switching process over the emissions' cap overcompliance. 
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Year
Kg/day
Actual Excess Excess without lack of historic data Excess without switching fuels 19 payments for permits. Considering that the switch to natural gas was quite important for compliance with the emissions cap, it is worth asking whether or not the tradable program had some role in encouraging sources to switch to cleaner fuels. 7 Empirical evidence does not support such a hypothesis. According to Coria (2006) , the lower price of natural gas seems to have been the main driver behind the switch while the tradable permit program had little or no effect. This result seems quite related to the features of the program. In fact, the aggregate excess of supply must have produced a very low permit price, making the benefits from saved emission permits irrelevant. Secondly, since dual sources were compelled to declare and offset their emissions as if they were using the dirtiest fuel, they had no expected gains from reduced payments for permits. Finally, the expected gains from reduced payments could have been also irrelevant since the lack of clearly defined monetary penalties and sanctions did not provide enough incentives for firms to take a high degree of compliance nor to invest in technologies to reduce emissions. Table 4 shows the trading activity to date. So far, 240 transactions have been approved, involving 445 sources and a 39% of the initial mass of emission permits 8 (a) It corresponds to the ratio between the total Kg/day traded and the number of transactions
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TRADING ACTIVITY AND TRANSACTION COSTS
Total Trading Activity
Source: Elaborated from data provided by PROCEFF Table 5 shows some statistics about the length of time required to complete the transaction process. The average period required for a transaction to be approved is about 20.5 months.
However, since at the beginning of the program there has been quite significant improvement. In fact, those transactions requested before 1998 needed more than 39 months to be approved 10 . Fortunately, the number of months the transaction process last has been trending downwards over time.
Surprisingly, intrafirm transactions required a longer period to be approved, suggesting that regulatory efforts were focused on reconciliation of permits and emissions between firms. 
Trading Process Period
Apart from the transaction costs and the uncertainty involved in the trading activity, the long period it takes to the environmental authority to reconcile permits and emissions is also related to the high level of non-compliance from new large boilers. In fact, as it is show in the Table, it took several months for new large boilers requesting offsets to legally comply with the regulation. Thereby, non compliance it is not just related to the lack of clear and automatic penalties, but also to institutional failures making the compliance process uncertain and troublesome.
Since many large boilers are dual sources (light oil and natural gas) compelled to offset their emissions according to the dirtiest fuel, there is no reason to expect a significant increase in the trading activity because of the lack of natural gas. However, it could be 23 possible to expect an increase on the trading activity from single fuel large boilers.
Therefore we have divided the sample period from 1998 to 2003 and from 2004 onwards.
There is no evidence of an increase in the number of transactions approved from 2004.
During the former period, the average number of transactions per year was equal to 26.
Since 2004, it was equal to 13, although it has increased the rate of inter-firm transactions. Table 6 shows the effects of the policy adjustments described previously over the stock of emission permits. The increase in the rate of offsetting has reduced the total mass of permits by about 6.3%. On the other hand, the decrease in the concentration target accounts for another 20.2% decrease on this mass. Finally, 17.3% of the mass has been lost because existing boilers did not trade or use their permits before the legal deadline. Notice that the decrease in the amount of emission permits granted and the increase in the rate of offsetting have opposite effects on the attractiveness of trading. While the decrease in permits should have induced existing sources to trade before the decrease became binding, the increase in the rate of offsetting should have induced existing sources to retain permits if they were not sure of being able to buy permits back in the case they needed
POLICY ADJUSTMENTS
them. This second effect should increase over time since every time a new offsetting is produced, there is a net loss of permits in the market.
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Considering that 35% of the sources originally granted IDEs lost their emission permits, it is worth analyzing the reasons behind this outcome. Table 7 
IV. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM SANTIAGO'S TRADABLE PERMIT PROGRAM?
There is no doubt that despite of their theoretical advantages, tradable permit programs have been used far less frequently than command and control policies. Perhaps, one of the Besides the long period of time required to complete the transaction, the incidence of a significant group of smaller, older and poorly integrated sources loosing emission permits because they did not trade before the legal deadline represents further evidence of the 26 important role played by transaction costs preventing trading. On the other hand, the increase in the rate of non compliance as the optimal sources' response to the natural gas crisis reveals the important role played by the lack of enforcement.
But in spite of above described weaknesses, the aggregate cap on emissions have been met and the trading activity has increased trough time. However, is it likely that the high transaction costs has decreased trading, resulting that full cost-effectiveness has not been achieved.
A number of design modifications would have substantially improved the efficiency of the Santiago system:
• Better measurement of emissions at the time the program was implemented.
• More certain tenure over the permits
• Avoiding rules that hamper trade, as for instance, the offset rules that provide a bias against trade • Banking should be allowed in some form.
Thus, Santiago's experience shows us that the challenges of designing successful environmental programs in less developed countries should not be underestimated. If the Chilean environmental authorities do not work out the current weaknesses in design, the success of the trading program will remain quite limited. Obvious additional recommendations to improve the performance of the market are looking for ways to reduce transaction costs and to improve monitoring and enforcement. Improving data system and public access to data can help with the first task. In fact, although the environmental authority is supposed to yearly provide an updated record of emission permits in force, information about actual emissions, violations and trading is not publicly available.
Enhancing public access to this information can build credibility in the environmental program, allowing brokers to enter into the market to provide information about trading partners and about the trading process and finally, allowing society to exercise pressure over firms to improve their environmental performance.
But from the Chilean' experience we can also learn that are not clear reasons to believe that developing countries cannot benefit from the additional flexibility that tradable permits confer over more inflexible regulations. In fact, it took the USA some three or four decades of experimentation to learn how to design the institutions for a trading scheme. The Chilean 27 scheme compares quite favorably with all the early US programs and to the European ETS scheme that in spite of being launched long after the Chilean scheme has roughly speaking the same number of flaws related to over allocation and lack of clear rules for penalties.
Thus, one might thus say that this experience demonstrates that a middle-income country such as Chile is very capable of implementing this type of scheme even if much work remains before the design is really satisfactory. 
V.
Appendix 1: Comparison of Emission Trading Programs
